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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KATHRYN MYRNA NEWMEYER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

vs.
JEDDY PAUL NEWMEYER,

Case No. 19183

Defendant-Appellant.

NATURE OF CASE
This

is

hereinafter

a

divorce

referred

case.

The

defendant-appellant,

to as defendant,

seeks review of the

district court's decisions concerning the property distribution,
alimony, and attorney's fees.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

This case was tried on February 28th, 1983,
Judicial

in the Third

District Court in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,

before the Honorable Jay E.

Banks.

After trial, a divorce was

granted to the plaintiff.
The trial court awarded the plaintiff the parties' former
marital

abode.

JJ01nst

said

The defendant was awarded an equitable lien

home

in

the

amount of Thirty Two Thousand Six

6

Hundred Six Dollars ($32,606.00).
the care,

The plaintiff was

custody and control of the parties'

awar~ed

minor child,

CAROLYN, and Two Hundred Dollars per month child support.
plaintiff was also awarded One Dollar
alimony,

($1.00) per year as

a 1973 Ford Maverick automobile,

Thousand

Dollar

($17,000.00)

The

personal

and her Seventeen
savings account.

Additionally the plaintiff was awarded the income tax deduction
for the support of the minor child, CAROLYN, for

tax year 1982,

a permanent injunction, enjoining the defendant from having
contact with her at any time, at any place, or

in any manner,

except for purposes of arranging visitation, and attorney's fees
in the amount of One Thousand Four Hundred Twenty Three Dollars
($1,423.00).
The defendant was awarded an equitable lien in the parties'
real estate in the amount of Thirty Two Thousand Six Hundred
Six Dollars ($32,606.00), a 1971 Ford Maverick automobile, his
share of the parties' personal property which had been previously
divided between them and was stipulated to at the outset of
trial,

along with Seven Thousand Dollars ($7,000.00)

in his

savings account and his pension and profit sharing plan, free
and clear of any claim of the plaintiff.
awarded

the tax deduction

for

The defendant was also

the support of the parties'

7

1aughter, CAROLYN, for the tax year 1983 and subsequent years.
The defendant was ordered to maintain his health insurance on
the parties'

minor child.

The parties had no marital debt at

the time of trial.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The

plaintiff

respondent,

Kathryn Myrna Newmeyer,

hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, believing that this matter
was fully,

openly and fairly decided at trial, requests that

this court affirm the decision of the trial court below in all
particulars.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The parties were married on the 26th day of December, 1962.
They have one minor female child who was approximately twelve
years of age at the time of trial.
homes during their marriage.

The parties bought three

The first home, located at 382

Vitas Avenue in Salt Lake County, was purchased six months after
their marriage for Ten Thousand Six Hundred Forty Five Dollars
:sJ0,645.00J

(Tr. at 19).

The plaintiff paid Five Thousand Five

8

Hundred Dollars ($5,500.00)
(Tr. at 20),

of the down payment on said home

the defendant and his father

together, paid One

Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00)

of the down payment

(Tr.

at

20),

leaving

a

balance owing of Three Thousand Six

Hundred Forty Five Dollars ($3,645.00).
in the testimony concerning these amounts.
recollection,

(There is a dispute
To the best of his

the defendant claims he and his father put down

Two Thousand Dollars on the Vitas Avenue home,

and that the

plaintiff only put down Twenty One Hundred Dollars)
205).

(Tr.

at

Both parties worked at the time and contributed equally

to the Sixty Four Dollar ($64.00) per month payments due on the
remaining

Three

Thousand Six Hundred

($3,645.00)

balance until paid

(Tr.

Forty

Five Dollar

at 20 and 21).

also a dispute in the testimony on this point.

There is

The defendant

claims he made multiple principal payments on the first house
(as much as four or five times the principal amount) on occasion
(Tr.

at 206).

Even if true, this is not significant in contrast

with the total contributions by the parties and total equities
involved as is outlined below.
The parties lived in the Vitas home approximately seven
years (Tr.

at 21) when they moved to 3924 South 10th East,

Salt Lake County (Tr.

at 21).

in

The purchase price of this house

9

w~s

Twenty One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($21,500.00)

21).

(Tr. at

The transaction for the acquisition of the 10th East home

was in the nature of a

trade

(Tr.

at 21).

The parties herein

traded up and the seller of the 10th East home traded down, but
the seller

received cash compensation from the parties herein

to make

up

homes.

Within

p(operty,

for

the difference between the value of the two
three months of

the

trade on the 10th East

the plaintiff received Five Thousand Five Hundred

Dollars ($5,500.00) from her brother (Tr. at 22).
Dollars

($3,000.00)

($5,500.00)

Three Thousand

of said Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars

received by the plaintiff from her brother was paid

by the plaintiff on the house to the party with whom they had
traded,

and within one (1) year the plaintiff additionally paid

another

Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500.00) to that

same party.

Said Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500.00)

was received by the plaintiff out of the closing of her mother's
estate,

her mother having then recently died

(Tr.

at 23).The

parties subsequently made four payments of One Hundred Twenty
Three Dollars ($123.00) completing payment for the house on 10th
East (Tr. at 24).
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E1qhtePn Cents 1554,372.181 out of the sale of the 10th East

homP,

wh1:h 1mourt w1s

3ppl1g~

towari the purchas0

pr1~e

of the

The money usej to pay the d1ff 0 rence
betwenn tne purcnasP price of ane Hundred Eight Thousand Doll3rS
($1J9,JOO.OOI
Three HundrnJ
rec,>1·:,,J fr·•m

l.

on

tho

Sa~~nty

t>ia

Fortuna home and

tho

Fifty Four Thousand

Two Dollars anj Eighteen Cents ($54,372.181

sale of

the 10th East home came

from

E1ght 0 an Thousanj E1~ht Hundred Doll•rs
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The defendant paid Five Thousand One
Hundred T..,enty Nine Dollars and Fifty
Five Cents ($5,129.55) from his savin.Js
account (Tr. ctt 26).

The plaintiff thus invested additional cash of approximately
Forty Seven Thousand Dollars
the time of closing (Tr.

3t

The parties
be;:3me
f

separated

in

in the Fortuna home

at 27).
the Fortuna home from 1979 until they

in 1982.

Trial

in this matter ..,as held

in

bruary of 1983.

0

There

is

~~ich

contradictory

..,as purchased
The plaintiff

1.

testimony

in

the

transcript

the defendant's ne.., cash outlay on the Fortuna home

~ancerning

9

lived

($47,000.00)

in 1979,

(the

third house

listed on page

testified that the defendant pctid at

clo~ing

"nly Five Thousand One Hundred Twenty Nine Dollars and
r1'1e Cents
'"

Yo..,ever,

able
•F

($5,129.55)

to

in ne.., money on the Fortuna home.

the defendant,

remember,

said he

although

~1-::

i:;

in

at

.::irrorJ

1271,

't

(Tr. at

he admitted not being

thought he had contributed a

1bout Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00)
(Tr.

Fifty

total

to..,ards the Fortuna

(d<>fendant's statement of fact on this
is clear from the transcript ..,hen

12

ta~en

as a whole,

however,

that

Twelve Thousand Dollar

the defendant was mistaken about tho

($12,000.00)

amount.

purchasers of the Newmeyer's home on 10th East

Apparently the
(second home)

did not have enough down-payment money to qualify for financing.
(Tr. at 135).

It appears from the testimony (Tr. at 136), that

the real price the parties wanted for
Thousand Dollars ($52,000.00).

the house was Fifty Two

The defendant lent the purchasers

Five Thousand Four Hundred Dollars ($5,400.00), and then raised
the price of
Dollars

the home

to

($57,400.00).

Fifty Seven Thousand Four Hundred

The purchasers then had a sufficient

down-payment to qualify for a loan and purchased the home.

The

Newmeyers were not out anything because that same money loaned
was given back to them at closing, minus the costs of sale and
real estate commissions.

In any event the Newmeyers netted out

of the sale Fifty Four Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Two Dollars
and Eighteen Cents ($54,372.18)
would have agreed
Dollars ($52,000.00)
own.

to

sell

(Tr.

at 25), when in fact they

the house for

Fifty Two Thousand

to a buyer who could have qualified on his

The defendant's real cash contribution towards the purchase

of the Fortuna home was probably something more than the Five
Thousand One Hundred Twenty Nine Dollars

($5,129.00),

listed

on page 11, source (3), but was not further explained at trial.
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The
the

plaintiff and defendant both had experts testify at

time

of

trial

concerning

the

value

of

the

home.

The

testimony by each expert was based on a personal examination
of the Fortuna home and premises and written appraisals which
had

been

appraiser,

prepared
Mr.

shortly

before

trial.

The

plaintiff's

Paul Lund, testified that the home was worth One

Hundred Twelve Thousand Dollars ($112,000.00)
defendant's appraiser,

(Tr. at 51).

The

Mr. Blankenship, testified that the home

was worth One Hundred Twenty Two Thousand Dollars ($122,000.00)
(Tr.

at 50).

Close examination of the transcript reveals that

Three Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($3,600.00) of the difference
between the two

(2)

difference

opinion

recreational
house.

of

appraisals
as

to

($112,000 vs.
the

value

of

$122,000),

is a

an additional

vehicle garage which had been built behind the

The defendant's appraiser testified that this garage was

of significant value because most people looking for a home in
the

area

of

the

parties'

recreational vehicles.

home

would

want a

garage

for

The plaintiff's appraiser did not agree

and valued the garage as a storage area only.
The plaintiff had approximately Seventeen Thousand Dollars
1$17,000.00)

in her personal savings account at the time of

However,

in contradiction to the facts as stated by the

14

defendant in his brief,

only Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.UUJ

of said Seventeen Thousand Dollars

($17,000.00)

was from her parents'

remaining Thirteen Thousand

Dollars

estates,

the

($13,000.00) was from monies earned by her at work and

put in savings during the marriage
did not get credit for

(Tr. at 37).

Seven Thousand Dollars

account

(Tr.

at 37).

The plaintiff

the inheritance money twice as claimed

by the defendant in Point II of his Brief.

of trial

in her savings

($7,000.00)

The defendant had

in his savings at the time

The value of the defendant's retirement

(awarded to him)

was unknown at trial,

however,

the

defendant had been working at Utah Transit Authority under the
retirement plan for 12 or 13 years (Tr. at 126).
The

parties kept their

finances separate throughout the

entirety of the marriage (Tr. at 38).

The defendant worked full

time during the marriage (Tr. at 121, 122, 124).
worked during much of the marriage,

(Tr. at 39, 40).

15

and full

The plaintiff

time since 1975

ARGUMENT

POINT I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.

The defendant cites various cases in support of two
well known propositions of law.

The first is that this court

may review both questions of fact as well as questions of law.
Hansen vs.

Hansen,

537 P.2d 491

(Utah, 1975).

that although the trial courts findings,
especially

in a divorce case,

review by the Supreme Court,

The second is

judgments and decisions,

are looked upon with favor on

they are subject to review,

and

the exercise of the trial court's discretion is not without
limitation.
11967).

DeRose vs.

DeRose, 19 Utah 2d 77,

426 P.2d 221

This Court has ruled on many occassions that it will

defer to the judgment findings and decrees of the district court,
however,
of

the

where there is a clear abuse of discretion on the part
trial

court,

or

where

the

findings of fact are not

supported by the preponderance of the evidence, this Court may
substitute it's judgment for that of the lower court, and may
alter or amend the decision of the lower court or may remand
'he matter for

further proceedings as appropriate.

16

Christensen

vs. Christensen,

21 Utah 2d 261,

444 P.2d 511 (1968), §_raziano

vs. Graziano, 7 Utah 2d 187, 321 P.2d 931
!!ansen,

537 p.2d

491

(Utah,

1975),

(1958),

Hansen vs.

Watson vs. Watson,

561

P.2d 1072 (Utah 1977).
With these two propositions of law the plaintiff does

not disagree.

The trial court was not arbitrary or capricious , nor
did

it

abuse

A review

i t ' s discretion.

of

the

evidence

demonstrates that the preponderance of the evidence supports
the property distribution made by the court, especially as to
the parties'

relative equitable interests in the real estate

acquired by them during their marriage.

POINT II.

THE

DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY,

EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE LOWER COURTS
INCLUDING THE DISTRIBUTION OF EQUITY

IN THE PARTIES' FORMER MARITAL ABODE.

The parties'

home located at 3242 Fortuna Drive, Salt

Lake County, was awarded to the plaintiff.
with her

minor child,

Carolyn.

She resides there

There is no mortgage on the

17

hume.

The court found

the value of said home to be One Hundred

Seventeen Thousand Dollars ($117,000.00),

the defendant was

awarded an equitable lien in the amount of Thirty Two Thousand
Six Hundred Six Dollars ($32,606.00).

A.

The District Court Was Within The Limits Of It's

Discretion In Finding The Fortuna Home To Be Worth $117,000.00.
As is recited in the .Facts portion of this Brief, both
plaintiff and defendant produced expert witnesses at the time
of trial

(Tr.

at 2,

48).

These gentlemen were both qualified

as fee appraisers of real estate.
facts,

Again as is indicated in the

the plaintiff's appraiser submitted a written appraisal,

which he testified in support of, that the parties' marital abode
at

that

time was

($112,000.00).
house

was

worth One Hundred Twelve Thousand Dollars

The defendant's expert, testified that that same

worth One

Hundred Twenty Two Thousand Dollars

($122,000.00).

Both written appraisals were admitted in evidence

by the court.

The largest single discrepancy between the two

appraisals, as is detailed above, was as to the value of a second
recreational vehicle garage.
When the court published it's findings concerning the
critical issues subsequent to trial it indicated that it found

18

the

value

Dollars

of

the

home

($117,000.00).

to

be One AundrPd SeventPen Thousand

Defendant complains on appeal that said

finding as to value of the home by the court below is "a mere
compromise",
but

and "does not represent an exercise of discretion,

is an arbitrary and capricious act of the trial court."

The plaintiff disagrees.
publishing

The court did not at the time of

it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, or at

any other time,

indicate it's reasons, or the mental processes

gone through in arriving at the value
The

plaintiff

difference.

assumes

that

the

it found

court

for

the home.

simply split

the

The lower court may well have done, but if so, only

after having listened to the testimony of the experts in support
of their written appaisals, and having observed their demeanor,
and their ability to explain their different conclusions, and
having weighed the relative weight to assign to each appraisal.
Neither

party,

nor counsel,

has any information or

knowledge as to why Judge Banks valued the Fortuna home at One
Hundred Seventeen Thousand Dollars

($117,000.00), but assuming

that he did his job correctly as the finder of fact,
the

evidence presented by both appraisers,

and weighed

and assigned

appropriate weight to give to that evidence in his mind,
counsel for

the

neither

the defendant-appellant or plaintiff-respondent can

19

JY

from

the

transcript,

or from any other source,

that the

decision by Judge Banks was arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse
of discretion.
The assertion by the defendant that the trial court
must accept completely the testimony of either one appraiser
or the other,
other,

and totally discount the opinion of one or the

is clearly not correct.

The District Court may, and in

many cases obviously does, compromise, and correctly so in making
findings in these matters.

B.

The District Court Was Within The Limits Of It's

Discretion In Awarding The Defendant A Lien In the Amount Of
$32,606.00
The defendant-appellant recites at some length on pages
9,

10 and 11 the arithmatic process it supposes the trial court

went through

in arriving at the equitable lien figure awarded

to the defendant.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law along with
a decree,
Banks.

approved by defendant's counsel were signed by Judge

No more detail was given by the court concerning the

court's calculations, or the manner or method by which the court
l

0

tPrrnined what the defendant's equitable lien should be, than

20

is revealed in those approved and published Findings of
and Conclusions of

Law.

All

theories as

to

Fact

the arithmat1c

process discussed on pages 9, 10 and 11 of the defendant's brief
are merely speculation.
A review of the testimony as it

is outlined

in the

transcript is helpful in demonstrating that the court's decision
was clearly within

the discretionary limits enjoyed by the

district court in deciding these matters,

and

that the award

of an equitable lien to the defendant in the amount of Thirty
Two Thousand Six Hundred Six Dollars

($32,606.00)

was not an

abuse of discretion, nor an error of law.
Without

restating the facts portion of this brief,

the relevant evidence concerning the real estate
and summarized on the charts appearing below.
been prepared

from

the

statement

supported by the transcript.
numbers may be found

of

facts

is outlined

These charts have
above,

and are

References to the transcript page

in the statement of facts portion of this

brief.
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n t 1es first home
Putchased in 1962
G months after marriage
Purchase price - $10,645.00

382 VITAS AVENUE
Plaintiff put down

$ 5,500.00

Defendant put down

1,500.00

TOTAL down payment

$ 7,000.00

Purchase price

$10,645.00

LESS down payment
Amount left to
be paid in payments

7,000.00
$ 3,645.00

$3,645.00 to be paid off in $64.00 per
month payments.
Both parties
contributed.
Vitas home traded on hemp at 3924 South 10th East
in approximately 1969.

22

Parties second home
Purchased approximately 1969
3924 South 1000 East
Purchase Price - $21,500
3924 South 10th East
Parties gave Vitas home
in trade

$

11,950.00

Plaintiff's contribution
from inherited land from
father

3,500.00

Plaintiff's contribution
from mother's estate

5,500.00

TOTAL down payment in
form of trade and new
cash by plaintiff

s

20,950.00

PURCHASE PRICE

s

21,500.00
20,950.00

LESS down payment
Amount to be paid as
payments

$

550.00

Second home on 10th East sold in 1979, moved to 3242 Fortuna

23

. "1

'"'s third home
in 1979
P11r·~hase price $108,000.00
1,,,, cl1ased

The home purchased outright at closing.
~Pver any debt owed by parties thereon.
3242 Fortuna
Actual net amount
$
received by parties from
sale of 10th East home

54,375.18

New cash amount
contributed by plaintiff
from her father's estate,
mother's estate and personal
savings account

46,117.98

5,129.55

Actual amount new cash
contributed by defendant
from his savings account

TOTAL

$

105,619.71

Difference between purchase price of $108,000.00 and $105,619.71
was never expl~ined at trial
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Plaintiff's Total
Cash Contributions

Defendant's Total
Cash Contributions

PROPERTY
Vitas Home

10th East

Fortuna

TOTALS

$

5,500.00

from savings
prior to
marriage

5,000.00

sale of real
estate with
brother - given
by father

3,500.00

from mother's
estate

46,117.98

$ 1,500.00

from savings
account

-0-

from L:ither's
estate, mother's
estate and
monies earned
working

5,129.55

from his
savings
account

PLUS whatever amount
should be credited
to defendant for
lending purchaser
of 10th East home
$5,400.00.

$ 6,629.55 plus ?

$ 60,117.98

Plaintiff's total contribution towards purchase was almost
exactly nine (9) time as great as the defendants.
$46,000.00 of the plaintiff's total $60,000.00 contribution,
all of which came from private, separate sources (mostly her
parents' estates) came within three (3) years of separation and
four (4) years of final divorce.
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Plaintiff total contribution
Defendant total contribution

$

60,117.98

*

6,629.55
$

66,747.53

*credits nothing to defendant for lending
purchasers of second home $5,400.00
Court's findings as to
value of Fortuna property
at time of trial

117,000.00

$

66,747.53

LESS cash contributions of
parties
TOTAL equity due to
appreciation in all three
homes

50,252.57

$

One half of $50,252.47 equals $25,126.24
60,117.98
25,126.24

Plaintiff's contribution
one-half total equity

85,244.22
6,629.55
25,126.24

Defendant's contribution
one-half total equity

31,755.79
Defendant's
$32,606.00

equitable lien
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is

in

the

amount of

A

review

of

evidence

outlined

above

clearly

demonstrates that the lien amount awarded by the court below
was squarely within the limits of it's decision making discretion
and supported by the evidence.
There is slight disagreement in the testimony of the
two parties concerning the amounts each contributed toward the
purchase of the various houses.
incredibl~

Judge Banks found

on these points.
certain in her

No one knows how credible or

the parties'

respective testimony

Certainly the plaintiff appeared to be more

testimony (compare plaintiff's testimony Tr. at

19-27 with defendant's testimony Tr. at 121, 135-136).
event the discrepancies in the testimony,
the defendant's favor,
if

the district

contribution
($10,000.00),

court

was

in

In any

even if resolved in

make an insignificant difference.
had

believed

the

amount of

(which it apparently

~id

the
Ten

not),

defendant's
Thousand

Even
total

Dollars

the plaintiff still

contributed six times as much money from separate sources as
did the defendant.
Virtually all of the plaintiff's contributions were
from her sole and separate estate, and the vast majority of her
contributions came within three (3) years of separation and four
(4)

years of final divorce.

We have no way of knowing how the
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ourt

below divided

the equity in the Fortuna home based on

appreciation of all three homes,
divided

it equally.

but it appears Judge Banks

The defendant it appears in being awarded

a Thirty Two Thousand Six Hundred Six Dollar ($32,606.00) lien
is

being

allowed

to

share equally

appreciation when he had

in

the equity due

to

invested only between one-seventh and

one-tenth of the total monies invested by the parties.
The court below heard testimony concerning property
taxes paid

by plaintiff,

income

taxes paid

by defendant,

defendant's arrearages in temporary child support, and unpaid
bills

left

separation.
and

by

the defendant at

the

time of

the parties'

All of these matters were considered by the court

adjustments made

compensate for

them.

in

the defendant's equitable lien to

(See paragraphs 7 and B of the Findings

of Fact.)
The defendant further complains in his brief that the
court's published findings as to the parties' respective shares
in the home were inadequate.

The defendant, however, approved

the findings of fact and conclusions of law published by the
court previous to them being signed.
what
~ome,

The court clearly stated

it found concerning the defendant's equitable lien in the
and on all other matters,

(see Findings of Fact, paragraphs
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7 and 8).
i t found

The court was under no duty to state which test1mon.
more credible or

the arithmatic process it used ir'

determining the defendant's lien.
This court stated in 1977 in the case of Pearson v.
Pearson,

561 P.2d 1080 that "findings of fact and conclusions

of law will support a judgment even though they are very general
if they follow the allegation of the pleadings in most respects."
The findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case follow
the pleadings and give significant detail as to what the court
found.

c.

The Court's Ten Day_Delay In Ruling Did Not

Prejudice Either Party.
The trial in this matter was held on the 28th day of
February, 1983.
took all day.

The trial began at nine o'clock a.m., and it
At the conclusion of trial, the court indicated

that it would not rule at that time, but that counsel would be
informed as to when a ruling would be available.

Ten days later,

on March 10, 1983, counsel for plaintiff and defendant appeared
at Judge Jay Banks chambers
matter.

At

to

receive

the ruling in this

that time Judge Banks referred to his notes and
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,,i,

1

i shed

it's findings of fact,

conclusions of law and decree

,f divorce in the matter.
The defendant complains in his brief, at the bottom
of page 8 thereof,

that "the court's delay in ruling resulted

in a serious prejudice to the appellant".
There is no other reference to the delayed ruling in
the defendant's brief,

and not a shred of evidence is available

to support such a proposition.

Although the defendant claims

that the court did not rule until some three weeks subsequent
to the

trial,

in

fact

includes one weekend.

the ruling was ten days later, which
(Eight working days.)

It is equally

reasonable to believe that the additional time taken by the court
permitted it to make a more thoughtful decision.

POINT III.

THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT BOUND BY PROPOSALS MADE

IN PLEADINGS WHEN THE SAME ARE ARGUED AND SUBMITTED FOR DECISION
AT THE TIME OF TRIAL.

The defendant states on page 15 of his brief,
Point IV thereof,
thP plaintiff

that the court committed error

under

in awarding

the tax deduction for the support of the parties'
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minor child for calendar year 1982.

The plaintiff had in her

complaint offered the defendant, without exception, the deduction
for said minor child for
Federal).

income tax purposes,

(both State and

The defedant argues that the plaintiff having made

no motion to amend the pleadings at the time of trial to award
the plaintiff the tax deduction for calendar year 1982, the court
was powerless to do so, and committed error in granting said
deduction to the plaintiff for the tax year that had then just
passed.
The trial in this matter was held in February, 1983.
During the majority of the previous year the parties had been
separated (Tr. at 14).
The plaintiff paid the majority of the expense for
the support of the minor child during the year
parties were separ3ted,
child lived with her.

(1982),

in which the

(Tr. at 41 and 42),

in that the

The defendant contributed to the chiln

support only minimally during this period.

The defendant did

pay pursuant to court order One Hundred Twenty Five Dollars
($125.00) per month as temporary child support from July 20,
1982, to the time of trial in February, 1983.

At trial, however,

the plaintiff was aw3rded child support in the amount of Two
Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month.

3l

To assume,

however,

that this is the reason for

the

court's decision is speculation on the part of the plaintiff,
The facts are simply that having considered all the
evidence, and having the issue of the award of this claim for
deduction before it at the time of trial,

and having received

no stipulation from the parties concerning the matter which the
court had approved,
is no basis
committed

no

the lower court ruled as it did, and there

to amend
error.

that decision.
Rule 15

(b)

In doing so the court

of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure provides that,

"When issues not raised by the pleading are
tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings.
Such amendments of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform
to the evidence and to raise these issues
may be made upon motion of any party at any
time, even after judgment; but failure so
to amend does not affect the result of the
trial of these issues."
[Emphasis added]
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THE INHERITANCES RECEIVED BY THE PLAINTIFF

POINT IV.

DURING THE COURSE OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE, DID NOT BECOME PART

OF THE MARITAL ESTATE.

It is a clearly established point of law, that monies
received by a woman in a marriage as an inheritance or gift are
separate monies which are not merged
Article 22,

Section 2,

Utah Code Annotated,

estates,

her personal,

Utah State Constitution, Section 30-2-1,

(1953, as amended).

The monies
parents'

into the marital estate.

received

are,

by Kathryn Newmeyer

from her

were at the time received, and remainei

separate assets.

All of the monies invested by

the plaintiff in the purchase of the parties' three homes, except
the Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars

($5,500.00) originally

put down by the plaintiff on the Vitas Avenue home, came from
private,

separate sources,

which were not part of the marital

estate.
The defendant's father was living at the time and he
shall have whatever
through
estate

the

right is provided by him in his will, or

laws of intestacy,

to an

inheritance from

his

To allow the defendant to share in the monies receivei

by the plaintiff from her parents estates at the time of divorce,
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•n1

then

to

subsequently allow the defendant to receive any

inheritance he may receive from his parents estate, free from
any claim of the plaintiff, would be fundamentally unfair.

The

trial court did not commit error in treating the plaintiff's
private

monies

from

inheritance which were invested in the

parties real estate as her sole and separate funds.

POINT V.

THE

AW~RD

OF ONE DOLLAR PER YEAR TO THE

PLAINTIFF AS ALIMONY WAS APPROPRIATE.

In

arguing

awarded one dollar

that the plaintiff should not have been

($1.00) per year alimony, the defendant cites

the cases of Carter vs.

Carter,

563 P.2d 177, and MacDonald

vs. MacDonald,

236 P.2d 1066, 120 Utah 573.

they

to

pertain

propositions.

the

instant

The first

is

case,

stand

These cases, as
for

two major

that all things should be taken

into consideration in awarding alimony, and the second that the
wife's need

for

alimony is a part of the consideration, along

with the husband's needs, both parties income, and both parties
relative future earning capacity.
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With these propositions of law, we agree.

Defendant refer,

many times in his brief to the fact that the plaintiff had been
employed during a

far

the marriage than had
of trial

(Tr.

smaller portion of
the defendant.

the

total

period of

The testimony at the time

at 123 and 124) was that the defendant has been

almost continually employed during the marriage and has some
trade skills as a mechanic,
the other hand,
her

among others.

The plaintiff,

on

has never developed skills which have enabled

to make much more than minimum wage.

The defendant has,

at all times during the course of the marriage,
is evidence concerning

income),

(for which their

earned more money,

and had a

greater earning capacity than the plaintiff, and certainly did
at the time of trial.

The district court did not abuse it's

discretion in awarding Mrs.
One Dollar

($1.00)

approximately

per

twenty

Newmeyer alimony in the amount of

year

(20)

in

terminating

years.

a

Judge Banks'

marriage of
decision is

supported by the preponderance of the evidence as to the oarties
relative income, needs and earning capacity.
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POINT VI.

THE

AW~RD

OF ATTORNEY'S FEES BY THE COURT

BELOW WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE

AWARDED FEES FOR DEFENDING THIS APPEAL.

Defendant asserts that there was no evidence at the
time of

trial

plaintiff.

in support of the attorney's fees awarded the
The

defendant correctly states

in his brief

concerning the award of attorney's fees that "the only mention
of attorney's fees during the entire time of the trial was that
the plaintiff had paid the sum of Fourteen Hundred Twenty Two
Dollars ($1,422.00)".

(Tr. at 47 lines 11 through 13).

Defendant cites a case recently decided by this court,
namely Delatore vs.

Delatore,

day of February, 1984,
for

the

Utah Supreme Court, decided 21st

case no.

18625 (Green Sheets).

Counsel

plaintiff has examined the Delatore case, and would

concede the

issue but for

the following points.

In Delatore

this court in dealing with the attorney's fees issue stated that,

"The defendant complains that it was error
for the trial court to award the plaintiff
One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) attorney's
fees, because the record is devoid of any
evidence of testimony that it was a
reasonable amount.
~e agree.
The only
reference in the record to attorney's fees,
which has been cited to us by the plaintiff

36

were statements made by her counsel in his
opening statement and in his closing argument
that he was requesting Fifteen Hundred
Dollars ($1,500.00).
Those statements were
insufficient."
This Court goes on to explain in Delatore that,

"This Court has consistantly held that an
attorney's fees may not be awarded where
there is nothing in the record to sustain
the award either by way of evidence, or by
stipulation of the parties, as to how the
court may fix it".
It

seems

to the plaintiff,

Mrs.

Newmeyer,

that the

real question ought to be, whether or not the court had a basis
for determining the amount of time expended by her counsel, and
what a reasonable fee for that amount of time spent would be.
There was
trial

as

to

evidence before the court at the time of

the amount of

time which

plaintiff's counsel on her behalf.

had been expended by

That evidence was before

the court in the form of pleadings and other documents in the
court's file.

Judge Banks of the Third Judicial District Court

has been on the bench many years.
cases.

The plaintiff feels that it is safe to say that the trial

court below
filed,

He has tried many divorce

is familiar with the process by which cases are

brought to the point of being at issue, pretried by the
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uurt's

commissioner,

and

finally

set

for

trial and tried

rEsulting in a decision.
The district court's file

indicated at the time of

trial that summons and complaint had been prepared, filed and
served,

that discovery in the form of a deposition had been done,

that a Request for Trial Setting had been filed.
court's file

further

The district

showed that both parties had appeared at

a pretrial before the court commissioner.

The record further

reflected that the matter had not been settled at pretrial and
that a trial date had been set.

The court at the time it made

it's ruling was aware that both parties had appeared at trial
and that roughly six (6) hours had been spent in trial.
An
or

is more

interesting question arises.
familiar

with what

attorney to bill his time at,
judge?

is

a

Who knows better,

reasonable rate for an

the attorney or a district court

Certainly not any individual attorney.

Lawyers commonly

take the stand and testify concerning the amount of time they
have spent on cases, and that a reasonable rate in their opinion
is blank number of dollars per hour.

Most attorney's have no

basis upon which to so testify,

in that they have no real way

of knowing what others charge.

The district court judge, on

rheo, other hand,

hearing attorney's testify quite often as to
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what they charge is
else,

in a unique position,

to know how one attorney's

in contrast to

anyon~

fees compare to anothers, and

what a reasonable hourly rate in the legal community is.
At the time of trial Mrs. Newmeyer testified that she
had already paid Fourteen Hundred Twenty Two Dollars ($1,422.00)
in attorney's fees.

It seems to the plaintiff that Judge Banks,

having tried many divorce cases, and knowing what attorney work
must have been involved from the court's file,
been at the trial

himself,

to determine

reasonableness of the attorney's

the

was

and from having

in a unique position to be able
fee Mrs.

Newmeyer testified she had actually paid.
If plaintiff's counsel had testified in detail at trial
that he had spend

thirty five

(35)

hours on the case, and th3t

he billed his time at One Hundred Dollars
would the court have awarded
Hundred Dollars ($3,500.00).
unlikely.

the plaintiff Three Thousand Five
We do not know.

Why does it seem unlikely?

the court's

file,

believed such a

and

fee

($100.00) per hour,

based

on

it's

to be excessive.

However,

it seems

Because the Judge seeing
experience would have
Why should there be a

double standard?

Judge Banks at the time of trial had evidence

before him in the

form of

the court's
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file

and oral

evidence

c~m

the plaintiff herself which

J~cision

if believed supports his

as to attorney's fees.
The plaintiff further requests that this matter be

remanded to the district court for the purpose of determining
3ttorney's fees to be awarded the plaintiff incurred in defending
against this appeal.
In

a case

recently decided by this court, namely;

Carter v. Carter, 584 P2d 904, 906 (Utah 1978), the lower court
had, on the husband's petition to modify a decree of divorce,
partially granted said petition, and lowered alimony from Three
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350.00) per month to One Hundred Dollars
($100.00) per month.

court

should

have

The husband appealed, claiming the trial
totally eliminated the alimony.

The

wife-respondent on appeal defended against a further reduction,
and requested of the court that she be awarded her costs of court
and attorney's fees

in defending against her husband's appeal.

In Carter the court in granting the wife respondent costs and
1ttorney's fees on appeal stated,

"However inasmuch as the plaintiff (husband)
was unwilling to abide by the trial court's
ju~gment, and that she has been put to the
necessity of defending this appeal, the
plaintiff (husband) should have to bear the
cost thereof, including reasonable attorney's
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fees for her counsel.
We agree with the
reasonableness and propriety of her request.
Therefore the case is remanded for the
purpose of determining and awarding her such
attorney's fees. .
n

In this case the defendant husband appeals the trial court's
decision concerning equity in the parties' home when the evidence
directly supports the findings of the trial court.
seeks to terminate alimony of One Dollar

($1.00)

plaintiff after a

twenty (20)

herein has refused

to accept the lower courts

it was obviously reasonable,
to incur additional fees
Plaintiff feels

The defendant

year marriage.

per year to

The defendant
judgment,

when

and thereby causing the plaintiff

to defend the lower court

that defendant's appeal

judgment.

is frivolous and that

she should be awarded her fees on appeal.

CONCLUSION

The district

court

discretionary powers,

has

very

broad

limits

especially in a divorce case.

there is clear error of law,

set on

Only where

or abuse of discretion,

or will this court intervene.
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it's

should,

Judge Banks of the Third District Court made no errors of
J~w

in

rendering

his

decision

in

the

court below.

The

preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court's findings
as to the value of the parties' home and the parties' respective
equitable interests therein.
The trial made adjustments to the equitable lien awarded
the defendant

to adjust for various small

inequities in the

division of personal property,

taxes paid by one party, bills

paid

The lower court and published

by

another,

et

cetera.

findings of fact and conclusions of law approved by the defendant
as to substance and form and which meet statutory and common
law requirements.
The

trial court was free

to decide all

issues raised in

the pleadings, and which remained at issue at the time of trial,
including

the

issue

of which

party should

be

awarded

the

deduction for supoort of the parties' minor child.
The trial court correctly concluded that the money invested
by

and

the plaintiff in the parties' various homes remained her sole
separate

r~spective

property for purposes of computing the parties

financial

contributions

~om~s.
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in purchasing their various

ThP

lltil.3r1

of

1l1T1U:-'l'l

she has less earnin3 power,

i1-i1r1t1ft

t-•-,.,

~J

hid

an

c1lw1ys

ln

1m•

l::_:1•:'

madP

1

lpss

unt •It

money,

1:;

clearly fair.
The

plaintiff's

supported by hPr own

awarj

of

attorney's fees

testimony,

at

trial was

the court's observation and the

court's file.

The plaintiff in any Pvent should be awarded her

attorney's fees

in defending

This
decision

Court
below

should
in

additionally remand
purpose of

ag~inst

review

al

the

evidence

oarticulars

this matter

taking evidence as

to be awardPd

this appeal.

the plaintiff

ani

This

affirm the

Court

to the district court for thP

to appropriate attorney's fees

incurred in defending against this

appe a 1.
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